The Hard Fork: Foreign Policy Threatens to Split the Red Network

“When a leader is in the Democratic Party he’s a boss. When he’s in the Republican Party he’s nothing but a leader.”

– Harry S. Truman

August 21, 2025 — The red network that placed Trump in office ran into a problem when its client state, Israel, initiated a war with Iran.

Israel’s casus belli was to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear bomb, which it didn’t have the capabilities to do.

It was also designed to drag the U.S. into a war with Iran to change its regime (aka plunge it into chaos).

After the first attack, a portion of the red political network, and a loose collection of neocon never-Trumpers, sprang into action to pressure Trump and his administration to support Israel and go to war with Iran.

However, this effort immediately ran into opposition.

A large portion of the red network, and particularly its younger cohort, viewed a war with Iran as a clear violation of a core resonance that had bound the red network together: no more foreign wars.

The implication was that if Trump hard forked the network by going to war with Iran, the red network would shatter and his support would evaporate.

Trump, as the “leader” of the network, was immediately put on the horns of a dilemma.

Should he forcibly hard fork the red network and go to war with Iran and risk shattering his base? Or preserve the bulk of the network, but alienate the part of the network calling for action?

Here’s what Trump did to avoid a hard fork:

First, Trump proceeded slowly. He allowed the war to escalate, resulting in significant damage to both countries.

A week of daily damage from Iranian missiles punished Israel for undertaking unilateral action that impacted U.S. national security.

However, this delay and Israel’s mounting damage increased the intensity of the pressure applied by the pro-war network fork.

Eventually, Trump did take action. However, instead of going to war with Iran, he limited the U.S. focus to bombing Iranian nuclear facilities.

After the attack, he immediately claimed victory and that the bombing effort had completely achieved the reported objective of the war. He then focused his efforts on negotiating a ceasefire between Iran and Israel.

Trump gambled that the red network wouldn’t perceive a narrowly focused attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities as a significant betrayal. He also gambled that once he made the attack and claimed victory, Israel, which was taking daily damage, was in no position to continue the war, and that support would immediately evaporate.
He was right.

Hard Forks in Action

To fully understand how a hard fork can shatter a network (political, protest, or insurgent), let’s rewind to 2007 and the Iraq War.

In 2007, Iraq’s network insurgency was still going strong despite an intense four-year U.S. counterinsurgency effort. The reason the insurgency had done so well was due to its networked organizational structure.

Specifically, it was an open-source network that connected up to seventy diverse groups, all united by a common goal or resonance (to get the U.S. to leave Iraq).

These groups — ranging from nationalists to jihadi groups, tribal organizations, and criminal elements — didn’t agree on much else, let alone what to do with a victory.

This decentralized structure made the insurgency difficult to fight. If the U.S. was successful at slowly rolling up one group, it didn’t do much. That group was only one out of seventy, and another would soon take its place.

This diversity also made it impossible to negotiate with, since these insurgent groups didn’t agree on much besides defeating the U.S.

This decentralized network structure also made the insurgency extremely innovative. If one group had a new method of attack or unearthed a new U.S. weakness, they would stage an attack to demonstrate it publicly. If the demonstrations were successful, other groups would likely copy them.

Then, one thing changed. Al-Qaeda in Iraq, one of the many participants in the network yet claiming leadership, unilaterally decided that the war against the U.S. wasn’t moving fast enough, and that it wanted to go to war with the Shia militias as well.

To drag the insurgency into this new war, it attacked the Golden Mosque, a Shiite holy site, and the results were immediate. Huge Shia militias mobilized, operating without U.S. counter-pressure, to wage a war against the Sunnis, and were immediately successful.

The Sunni insurgent groups, caught on the horns of a dilemma, had to decide fast. To survive ethnic cleansing at the hands of Shia militias, they needed to centralize their organizational structure to form large units capable of defending themselves.

However, if the Sunnis did centralize, their militias would be easily targeted by U.S. forces. Faced with a choice of ethnic cleansing or a negotiated peace (along with protection) with U.S. forces, one group after the other chose peace.

The Red Network’s New Structure

In 2016, the red network fell apart after the election, as nobody could agree on what to do once the objective was completed (i.e., getting Trump into office).

In 2024, the result was different. The red network became a loose association of large social media accounts that share a common resonance. This structure kept the network relatively cohesive after the election, and many of these large accounts became part of the new government.

However, since these large accounts don’t agree, but only resonate on some core themes, forks were inevitable. So, although the red network’s new configuration did provide it some much-needed cohesion, it wasn’t a complete solution to its core problem.

For example, an early minor fork was the redirection of the ICE crackdown to target individuals opposed to Israel’s war in Gaza. That fork ignited early opposition to the ICE crackdown, even within the red network, due to the way it threatened free speech (a major resonance for the network). A major fork was Musk’s departure over spending and immigration; that fork is still in motion.

What to Expect Going Forward

More forks. The red network hasn’t developed a structure yet that will prevent forks in the future.

With each new fork, red network participants will depart, and opposition to its policies will form in unexpected quadrants. Given what we’ve seen so far, the red network may shatter (again) before the 2028 elections, making it possible for the blue network to take power.

The red network might evolve again. One potential evolution is the development of resonant orientation, as opposed to the reflexive opposition (no DEI, no wars, no immigration) we see in both the blue and red networks.

An orientation in decision-making points you in the direction of solutions that will benefit you. It guides you forward, allowing you to make decisions dynamically rather than reflexively. However, we might not see an evolution like this until 2032.

Another potential evolution is to consult the network on big decisions. For example, a monthly meeting of key accounts in the red network to discuss strategies for any given issue.

Or consult them at a distance by floating key decisions online to see how the network, and crucially the big accounts, respond to them.

If they largely oppose a decision, table it. If they offer feedback on how to improve it, use that feedback to improve the decision’s resonance with the network.

In short, utilize network decision-making to enhance the cohesion of the network with each step forward, rather than fighting against it.

John Robb
Grey Swan Investment Fraternity

P.S. from Andrew: John Robb’s insights first appeared in our July issue of the Grey Swan Bulletin. Paid-up Fraternity members can catch John’s insights monthly.

Since then, President Trump has shifted foreign policy towards ending the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, now in its third year. John’s focus on how foreign policy plays out as a contest between opposing networks provides greater clarity than American news headlines.

We expect further tension between President Trump and parts of his base as he works on more foreign policy deals ahead of next year’s midterms.

With the conflict in Eastern Europe potentially winding down, other hotspots may flare up next. That’s a topic we’ll look to cover in next week’s Grey Swan Live! More details as we get closer…

Your thoughts? Please send them here: addison@greyswanfraternity.com