Housing Bust Update: It’s Not Just the Cost of Buying, It’s the Cost of Owning
Home prices are at all-time highs, and — amazingly — are still rising. Compare today’s average price to that of 2007, which is generally thought to be the peak of America’s biggest-ever housing bubble:
And mortgage rates, which were supposed to fall when the Fed started easing in September, are instead rising. 7%, here we come.
Life is clearly hard for those who have to buy a house these days. But for a lot of people who did, at some time in the past, manage to buy a house, there’s another problem: The cost of keeping that house is skyrocketing, putting homeowners in a bind. They can’t sell because no one can buy, but they can’t stay put because the costs of doing so are becoming ruinous. Here’s an excerpt from a recent Charles Hugh Smith post on this topic:
The soaring costs of home ownership are changing the metrics of unaffordability in important ways.
Traditionally, the primary cost of home ownership everyone tracks is the mortgage payment, the famous monthly nut of principal and interest, which of course goes up with the purchase price and the interest rate of the mortgage.
As we all know, both the purchase price and the interest rate have gone up significantly, pushing the mortgage payment as a percentage of median household income up to levels that exceed the previous peak in Housing Bubble #1 circa 2006-08.
But the mortgage payment isn’t the only cost of owning a home. All the other costs that were relatively affordable in decades past are now skyrocketing. Gordon Long lists the six basic categories of home ownership expenses: mortgage, property taxes, insurance, utilities, maintenance and repair and home-related services.
Anecdotally, we’re hearing accounts of basic home insurance jumping from $3,000 to $13,000 annually in high-risk regions. We’re also hearing of insurers abandoning high-risk areas and entire states, leaving homeowners with few options for insurance. In response, some homeowners are “self-insuring,” i.e. they have dropped insurance coverage.
The problem with this option is that should the worst-case scenario come to pass, as a general rule the federal disaster relief agencies will pony up a maximum of $40,000 to the uninsured–far from enough to rebuild or repair a severely damaged house.
Insurers are not in the charity business. Once their losses run into the billions of dollars, they jack up rates to restore profitability. Recall that insurance is a global enterprise, and so the cost of our insurance is partly based on the cost of the reinsurance the big carriers purchase globally. If reinsurance rates rise, everyone’s rates rise accordingly.
Unsurprisingly, homeowners are responding by raising the deductibles in their policy to lower the annual cost. This is a hybrid of “self-insurance,” as homeowners with high deductibles have to have the cash in hand to fund the cost of repairs up to the deductible ceiling.
If you think the rise in the price of groceries is eye-popping, check out property tax increases, which are pushing 30% nationally. Since local governments depend on property taxes for a significant percentage of their revenues, we can expect these taxes to remain “sticky” even if housing valuations decline.
The costs of maintenance and repair are soaring as well as the costs of construction materials and labor have increased, along with the other costs of doing business. Just as the cost of a sandwich or burger seems to be about $15 everywhere, the cost of any home project other than fixing a leaky faucet seems to be $10,000 or more now: tree pruning: $10K, roof repair, $10K, and so on.
The soaring costs of home ownership are changing the metrics of unaffordability in important ways. It’s not just the initial purchase price that defines what’s affordable and what isn’t; so too do the costs of owning the house after our name is on the property tax rolls.
Home Prices Have to Crash
This is clearly an unsustainable market where something has to give. Taxes and insurance premiums have to plunge (dream on), mortgage rates have to plunge (possible but only in some kind of crisis), or home prices have to fall by 30% or more (bordering on “sure thing”).
Trump and Powell are no buddies. They’ve been fighting over rate cuts all year—Trump demanding more, Powell holding back. Even after cutting twice, Trump called him “grossly incompetent” and said he’d “love to fire” him. The tension has been building for months.
And Trump now seems ready to install someone who shares his appetite for lower rates and easier money.
Trump has been dropping hints for weeks—saying on November 18, “I think I already know my choice,” and then doubling down last Sunday aboard Air Force One with, “I know who I am going to pick… we’ll be announcing it.”
He was referring to one Kevin Hassett, who—according to a recent Bloomberg report—has emerged as the overwhelming favorite to become the next Fed chair.
Here we sit — investors, analysts, retirees, accountants, even a few masochistic economists — gathered beneath the leafless monetary tree, rehearsing our lines as we wait for Jerome Powell to step onstage and tell us what the future means.
Spoiler: he can’t. But that does not stop us from waiting.
Tomorrow, he is expected to deliver the December rate cut. Polymarket odds sit at 96% for a dainty 25-point cut.
Trump, Navarro and Lutnick pine for 50 points.
And somewhere in the wings smiles Kevin Hassett — at 74% odds this morning, the presumed Powell successor — watching the last few snowflakes fall before his cue arrives.
With U.S. stocks trading at about 24 times forward earnings, plans for capital growth have to go off without a hitch. Given the billions of dollars in commitments by AI companies, financing to the hilt on debt, the most realistic outcome is a hitch.
On a valuation basis, global markets will likely show better returns than U.S. stocks in 2026.
America leads the world in innovation. A U.S. tech stock will naturally fetch a higher price than, say, a German brewery. But value matters, too.
As copper flowed into the United States, LME inventories thinned and backwardation steepened. Higher U.S. pricing, tariff protection, and lower political risk made American warehouses the most attractive destination for metal. Each new shipment strengthened the spread.
The arbitrage, once triggered, became self-reinforcing. Traders were not participating in theory; they were responding to the physical incentives in front of them.
The United States had quietly become the marginal buyer of the world’s most important industrial metal. China, long the gravitational center of global copper demand, found itself on the outside.
