Beneath the Surface
Legacy of the Grey Swan: The Accountant With Our Book on His Desk
November 21, 2026 • 20 minute, 35 second read

“Accounting is the language of business.”
~ Warren Buffett

You’d think a country running trillion-dollar deficits might want to listen to its chief accountant. But Washington has always been better at spending money than listening to the people keeping track of it. (Source: Shutterstock)
Last time, we left Warren Buffett in Omaha, where he had agreed to appear in our film and, as we’ll eventually get to, managed to make the opening-night conversation much more interesting than we had planned.
Before Buffett could become the marquee name that opened other doors, however, we needed a structure for the movie itself, and that came from a man whose job title could scarcely have sounded less cinematic.
I first came across David Walker’s argument on the front page of USA Today. It’s hard to believe now, but readers of the nation’s newspaper used to actually care about fiscal responsibility in Washington.
David was then Comptroller General of the United States, the head of the Government Accountability Office, the nation’s top accountant, and he had distilled the country’s fiscal condition into four deficits: the federal budget deficit, the savings deficit, a gaping trade deficit and… the worst… what he called a leadership deficit.
The first three could be expressed in dollars. The fourth explained why Washington could calculate the problem over and over again, understand the problem perfectly, and do nothing about it. Repeatedly.
The budget deficit was familiar enough. Washington spent more than it collected in taxes and borrowed the difference. It’s quaint to think of it now, but at the time, we were alarmed that the debt was approaching an inconceivable $10 trillion.
Social Security, Medicare and other promises continue to accumulate on autopilot (to this day) above and beyond the annual appropriations process. And to this day, Congress has not passed all 12 spending bills that go with an annual budget in a single fiscal calendar year. The last time that feat was accomplished was in fiscal year 1996, a decade before we set out to make the film.
American households, then as now, were engaging in their own version of the habit, saving less and using credit, home equity and rising asset prices to sustain consumption.
The trade deficit put the same behavior on an international scale. America bought more goods and services from abroad than it sold and financed the difference by sending dollars, Treasury securities and claims on American assets back the other way.

America’s trade deficit has become a permanent feature of the modern economy — a reflection of decades of consuming more than we produce, financed in part by the world’s appetite for U.S. assets and dollars. (Source: Census Bureau)
(We could have a debate, if you wanted to, about the tariffs the current President has put in place, but suffice to say, even with increased tariff revenues going to the government, the trade gap has widened each year of the current administration’s second term.)
David’s characterization of the “leadership deficit” was what stuck with me. In our strategy sessions for drafting the plot and filming, David would often say: “It’s all right. We’re speaking ‘truth to power.’”
Mr. Walker was used to doing so and confident in his delivery.
He had spent enough time around Congress to know that intelligent people in both parties understood the arithmetic perfectly well. The difficulty appeared when any proposed solution crossed the border between accounting and politics, where taxes, promised benefits and election calendars suddenly became much more interesting than actuarial tables.
The problem, of course, persists today, with one slight distinction: We don’t talk about fiscal responsibility as a duty for elected officials anymore.
To our surprise, when we went to meet David at the GAO headquarters in Washington for the first time, a copy of Empire of Debt was sitting on his desk. “I read it from cover to cover,” he told our little film crew. We were fairly convinced he had.
Bill Bonner and I had written the book from the comfortable remove of the newsletter business, where one is free to describe the federal balance sheet as evidence of institutional folly without having to audit a federal agency the following morning.
David’s office, on the other hand, was responsible for examining how government programs worked, where the money went and which obligations were accumulating outside the annual budget process or the average attention span of a member of Congress with one eye on early November every two years.
While he said he enjoyed the read, he didn’t need us to convince him that the country’s fiscal habits deserved more scrutiny. He had already been trying to make the same case in a different language and from inside the government itself.
David was not a natural prophet of doom.
He was an accountant who believed ordinary people could understand the problem if somebody bothered to explain it honestly, which made him much more useful for a movie than somebody pacing a stage predicting national ruin.
He could explain Social Security as a promise between generations, Medicare as a commitment whose cost rose as medicine improved and people lived longer, and foreign borrowing as an exchange between present consumption and future claims.
By the time we met him, David and Bob Bixby of the Concord Coalition had already taken the argument on the road with what they called the Fiscal Wake-Up Tour.
Their audiences gathered in universities, civic auditoriums and community halls around the country to hear a presentation about federal finances that did not come with a band, a laser show or particularly good coffee.
We began following them with cameras.
Chicago, Seattle, Omaha, Washington, New York, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, Des Moines, Iowa, Concord, New Hampshire… editorial boards, media studios, and back-of-the-bar rendezvous with feature-length exposé journalists… a succession of airports and hotel lobbies eventually blurred into one another.
Back then, much of documentary filmmaking consisted of moving equipment through places that seemed to have been purposely designed to make setting up difficult. Today’s iPhones have better microphones and cameras than a van full of film and sound equipment did back then. But then, the iPhone hadn’t yet made it to market.

Heavy cameras, mountains of equipment and enough cables made a simple interview feel like a small military operation. Today, a smartphone can outperform that entire setup. (Source: Shutterstock)
David and Bob repeated the argument in room after room, but the audiences never reacted in quite the same way.
Most people were perfectly willing to agree that deficits were a problem, as long as the discussion remained at the level of national virtue. The atmosphere changed once the arithmetic wandered into taxes, retirement benefits and programs people had built into their plans for the future.
Bob had watched enough of these conversations over the years to know how quickly broad support for fiscal discipline could become a considerably more specific argument over whose discipline should be imposed.
The Fiscal Wake-Up Tour gave us something a policy paper never could.
We could watch people trying to absorb the implications of numbers they had previously encountered only in headlines, while David stood in front of them, turning those numbers into promises, trade-offs and claims on somebody’s future income.
Federal debt itself was not much of a character.
Unfunded liabilities don’t blink or catch a cold. They can’t hesitate, jitter or sweat under duress. David could carry the story because he had spent years learning how to give the numbers a human scale.
What an unlikely and improbable venture! David’s four deficits eventually became the skeleton of the film.
The federal budget deficit took us into Washington, and the long promises attached to entitlement programs. The savings deficit brought the argument into American households, while the balance-of-payments deficit carried us overseas, particularly toward China, where American consumption had become the other side of another country’s reserve accumulation.
The leadership deficit brought us back to the people making the promises. Over and over again.
It gave us a way to examine the political incentives that allowed the arithmetic to grow while everybody agreed, in principle, that something ought to be done.
Once that structure was in place, the other interviews began to fit around it.
And then Warren Buffett said yes.
Warren Opens the Doors
Buffett’s agreement to participate changed more than the atmosphere around the project.
It changed the response we got when we picked up the phone.
Until then, we were a group of financial publishers trying to make a documentary about debt. We could explain that Empire of Debt had become a bestseller, that David Walker was traveling the country warning about the federal balance sheet and that we intended to turn the argument into something people might actually sit through in a theater.
All of that was useful.
None of it worked quite as efficiently as saying Warren Buffett had agreed to sit for an interview. He had also agreed to help us bring his Fortune essay about Squanderville to the screen.
Buffett had published the piece in 2003, using two imaginary islands to explain the consequences of persistent trade deficits. Thriftville lived within its means and accumulated claims. Squanderville consumed more than it produced and gradually issued claims against its assets to finance the difference.
The parable did in a few pages what a great many economists had managed to obscure beneath the phrase current-account imbalance. Or trade gap, which sounds more profane.
We wanted to animate it.
Buffett liked the idea enough to participate, and once his name was attached to the film, people who might reasonably have wondered why they should surrender an afternoon to a couple of newsletter publishers began finding room in their calendars.
Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan both agreed to sit with us. Between them, we had two former Federal Reserve chairmen who had occupied the same office during very different monetary eras.
Volcker had lived through the brutal work of breaking inflation in the early 1980s, when interest rates rose high enough to produce recessions, political outrage and farmers driving tractors into Washington.
Greenspan had presided over the long expansion of credit that followed, through the 1987 crash, the technology boom-and-bust, and the housing market that was beginning to wobble while we were still filming.
Their résumés made them sound like opposing monuments to Federal Reserve history.
The camera made them human again.
Volcker had the physical presence of a man who seemed to occupy more room than his chair technically permitted. He had lived through the political consequences of monetary restraint and knew that “fighting inflation” sounds much cleaner in an economics text than it feels when mortgage rates reach double digits.
Greenspan spoke with the caution of somebody whose sentences had been parsed by bond traders for decades. There was a reason he had developed a reputation for speaking in a dialect halfway between English and central banking.
The Treasury side brought Robert Rubin and Paul O’Neill.
Rubin had moved between Goldman Sachs and Washington and served as Treasury secretary during the Clinton years, when federal surpluses briefly ceased to sound like something found in ancient scripture.
O’Neill had run Alcoa before becoming George W. Bush’s first Treasury secretary and brought the temperament of an industrial executive who had seen the policy machinery from inside the cabinet room.
Congress supplied its own collection of characters. Senators Kent Conrad and Judd Gregg, the senior Democrat and Republican on the Senate Budget Committee, agreed to participate.
In the House, we interviewed Ander Crenshaw, George Miller and Ron Paul, whose questions about debt tended to wander toward the monetary system that made so much borrowing possible in the first place.
The economists, budget people and analysts widened the argument further.
Alice Rivlin had been the founding director of the Congressional Budget Office and later vice chair of the Federal Reserve. Arthur Laffer brought the supply-side argument about taxes and incentives, while Steve Forbes had spent years arguing for sound money and simpler taxes.
Bob Bixby carried the institutional memory of the Concord Coalition. James Areddy helped us look at the American trade deficit from the Chinese side of the ledger from his office at the Wall Street Journal in Shanghai.
The Wall Street contingent came with its own histories: Buffett had built Berkshire Hathaway by allocating capital with almost comic patience; Pete Peterson had run Lehman Brothers before co-founding Blackstone; Rubin had spent decades at Goldman Sachs before entering government.
Steve Forbes occupied his own peculiar intersection of markets, publishing and presidential politics.
Bill Bonner had built an international financial publishing business largely by cultivating writers who regarded both Wall Street and Washington as establishments worth keeping at arm’s length.

With this collection of talent in one room, turn on the cameras, and we had decades of monetary, fiscal and investment wisdom arguing with itself in real time. (Source: Shutterstock)
The cast covered enough ideological territory that getting everybody to endorse a single fiscal prescription would have required a longer movie and possibly several hostage negotiators.
That was fine by us. We didn’t need a chorus.
We needed people who had spent their adult lives working different parts of the machinery David Walker was describing.
Buffett had not endorsed our conclusions when he agreed to participate. We did not yet know whether he agreed with several of them.
He had simply agreed to talk. That was enough to make other people answer the phone.
In Walked His Friend, Pete Peterson
Pete Peterson had been in our research files before he entered the film. We had used his book Gray Dawn while researching several of our own books.
Published at the end of the 1990s, Gray Dawn examined the demographic arithmetic already bearing down on the United States, Europe and Japan: people were living longer, birth rates were falling, and a growing population of retirees would increasingly depend on a proportionately smaller working population.
Pete had been writing about the economic consequences of aging years before the phrase demographic cliff became a fixture of investment presentations.
Debt figures tell you how much has already been borrowed. Demographics give you some sense of who will be around to honor the promises that have not yet come due.
Social Security and Medicare were designed in a country with a younger population, shorter retirement periods and a very different relationship between workers and beneficiaries.
Add years to average life expectancy, reduce the number of children entering the workforce and continue making benefits politically difficult to alter, and the accounting begins moving even while Congress is out of session.
Pete had spent years worrying over that arithmetic.
His own story began in Kearney, Nebraska, where his father, a Greek immigrant, opened a café that stayed open around the clock. Pete liked to tell the story that when his father finally retired, nobody could find the key to the front door because the family had never needed to lock it.
The Central Café had been open twenty-four hours a day for years.
Pete grew up working the cash register and watching his father serve railroad workers, travelers and farmers at whatever hour they happened to walk through the door.
We always liked that story because it sat so strangely beside everything Pete became later.
He went from the family café to MIT and the University of Chicago, then into advertising and industry. He eventually became chairman and CEO of Bell & Howell, joined the Nixon administration as an adviser on international economic affairs and served as Secretary of Commerce.
After Washington came Lehman Brothers.
In 1985, he and Stephen Schwarzman started Blackstone.
Pete also spent more than two decades as chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations, which placed him squarely in the narrow corridor where Wall Street, Washington and foreign policy tend to bump into one another.
By the time we knew him, he had accumulated enough money and institutional experience to spend a good portion of his later life worrying about what the country was doing with its own balance sheet.
He had also helped establish the Concord Coalition, where Bob Bixby had spent years watching the fiscal argument migrate from one administration to the next.
The Fiscal Wake-Up Tour brought those worlds together. David had the federal balance sheet and the credibility of the Comptroller General’s office. Bob had the accumulated experience of trying to make fiscal reform survive contact with politics. Pete had spent years thinking about the demographic obligations lying underneath the same numbers.
By the time Pete began assembling the Peter G. Peterson Foundation, David Walker looked almost custom-built for what he had in mind.
David had a national network from the Wake-Up Tour, the authority of the GAO and an increasingly public identity tied to the four deficits.
Pete had capital. Quite a large pile, in fact.

For Pete Peterson, the best opportunities often appeared when everyone else was looking in the other direction. He stressed thinking for yourself, looking past the noise and letting fundamentals — not headlines or market hysteria — drive decisions. (Source: Shutterstock)
When he began talking about putting roughly a billion dollars behind the new Foundation, the scale of the offer made the usual Washington reform organization look like a bake sale.
David was still serving a fifteen-year term as Comptroller General, which had been designed to insulate the office from ordinary political cycles.
Leaving early meant giving up a position with unusual independence and authority inside government.
Pete was offering him something the GAO could not provide: an institution devoted entirely to the fiscal problem, backed by enough money to carry the argument far beyond congressional testimony and government reports.
By then, we had traveled enough with David to understand why that appealed to him.
He had seen the four deficits land in city after city.
He knew how much more powerful the story became when it escaped Washington’s vocabulary and entered the lives of people sitting in the audience.
There was also our movie.
As I remember the negotiations, David wanted the new Foundation to acquire the assets surrounding I.O.U.S.A. as part of the move.
Not merely sponsor a few screenings or pay for some advertisements.
Buy it.
That was when our little documentary introduced us to another part of Hollywood.
And a Battery of Lawyers in Very Expensive Suits
There were lawyers everywhere. The legal budget, in fact, exceeded the cost of making the film.
A finished movie looks simple to the audience. The lights go down, the picture begins, and eighty-five minutes later the credits roll.
Behind those eighty-five minutes sits a small civilization of contracts, releases, music rights, interview rights, graphics, footage licenses, production agreements, investor interests and distribution arrangements.
Every person who had contributed to the film seemed to have prepared a document detailing precisely what we could and could not do with it.
Entertainment attorneys possess an unusual ability to make an ordinary word occupy most of an afternoon.
“Rights,” “assets,” “ownership,” and “distribution” acquired subtleties that had never occurred to us when we were simply trying to get a camera crew into another city before sunrise.
The Peterson Foundation had its attorneys. We had ours. The producers, distributors and investors had their own interests to protect.
Hollywood may trade in stories, but its lawyers trade in chains of title, trademarks, creative rights, royalty structures and tiffs over “final cut”. Making the film was fun, entertaining and educational. Selling it was a maddening and tedious affair. The lawyers knew it and would wear me down if I let them.
David Goes to Sundance
While all of that legal machinery was beginning to turn, David got to see what had happened to his four deficits once we put them on a movie screen. I.O.U.S.A. was accepted into the American Documentary Competition at Sundance in January 2008.
Park City was full of directors, actors, agents, distributors, publicists and people whose job it was to know which decadent party mattered and which ski-in-ski-out chalet had been rented by which celebrity entourage.
Heh. We had brought the Comptroller General of the United States. So there.
There was an agreeable absurdity in watching David move through that world. Other documentaries dealt with war, murder, sex, addiction, celebrity and families coming apart under unusual pressure.
Ours had Medicare.
David appeared before audiences who had just spent the better part of two hours watching him carry the same argument from city to city.
On the Fiscal Wake-Up Tour, he had been speaking in civic halls and universities where some members of the audience had arrived because their organization thought somebody ought to go.
At Sundance, people bought tickets to see it happen in surround-sound.
They had actually chosen to spend part of their day watching a film about federal liabilities.
Then something remarkable happened. When David came out, live and in person, to answer questions during a staged Q&A session after the screenings, people stood.
The first standing ovation surprised us. Then it happened again. And again.
The title “Comptroller General” had disappeared somewhere during the movie.
David had become a man trying to explain something unpleasant before circumstances gave people what they had coming, “good and hard.”
Pete Peterson watched the film from a different angle. He was not putting a billion dollars into a foundation because he wanted a successful festival run.
He wanted younger Americans, business leaders, journalists and policymakers to confront the fiscal argument, and suddenly there was a film built around the man he was recruiting to lead the effort.
The project had begun before the Peterson Foundation existed.
By the time the Foundation was taking shape, I.O.U.S.A. had already followed David around the country, turned his four deficits into a narrative and brought Warren Buffett, Paul Volcker, Alan Greenspan, Pete Peterson and the rest of the cast into the same conversation.
We had spent more than two years carrying the production through airports, editing rooms, budget overruns and financing problems.
Pete saw something that could go into theaters, onto college campuses, into congressional offices and eventually onto television, with David standing beside it to continue the discussion after the lights came up.
The reported purchase price was $2.5 million. Where that figure actually came from, we still don’t know. I do know that the sale helped get me out from under the cost of making it. After the amount of money, aggravation and legal attention the production had consumed, that number resonated like a puff of smoke from a hookah pipe.
It also meant the movie was no longer merely ours. The original intention was to see our research and writing displayed across a marquee and a movie screen. But the film, especially with all those characters involved, took on a life of its own.
We had approached I.O.U.S.A. as publishers tend to approach an argument. We were comfortable allowing Buffett to disagree with Walker and Ron Paul to challenge assumptions that Greenspan had spent decades working inside.
Pete had spent much of his life worrying about the same fiscal problem and was now devoting a sizable portion of his fortune to it. We were under the impression during the sale that the Foundation could take it to theaters and campuses, show it to members of Congress, and host events around the issues David was explaining on screen.
As the film was moving toward its public release, storm clouds were gathering rapidly over Wall Street. And Warren Buffett was waiting back in Omaha, where we expected the most famous investor in America to help introduce our little documentary about debt to the country.
We had not yet heard what he intended to say once the lights came up.
More to come… stay tuned.
~ Addison
P.S. On Sunday evening, August 15, 1971, President Nixon interrupted regular TV programming to “temporarily” cut the dollar’s link to gold. Within 48 months, the dollar had lost more than 80% of its purchasing power against gold.
Most Americans didn’t see it coming. This time you’re getting a warning in advance…
I learned my first lesson about free markets 39 years ago, in a parking lot outside a Grateful Dead show. Folks traded food, jewelry and beer, and the ones who showed up early got the best spots. Money works the same way.
When the dollar moved off gold, and again when it moved to oil, the people first in line built fortunes. It’s about to happen a third time, and here’s how to get there early.





