Framing a Conflict With China

“We do not benefit from a relationship with China or any other country in which we put our values and our ideals aside.”

– Barack Obama

Author's Image

May 6, 2025 — The US has been on the road to conflict with China since 2001, when Clinton and Gore pushed for China’s entry into the WTO (World Trade Organization) by claiming that capitalism would inevitably democratize China.

It didn’t, but it did put on a course toward conflict.

Now that the conflict is finally reaching a breaking point (embargoes, tariffs, cyber disruption, potential invasions, etc.), let’s spend some time framing it in a way that will help us make sense of it.

Orienting the Conflict

The first step is to orient our thinking by determining what kind of war this is and what victory looks like.

While this conflict could become a war, that isn’t likely since it isn’t a struggle between existentially incompatible systems.
On the contrary, we both use the same system (capitalism) and profit mightily from participating in a global trading system. It’s in neither country’s interest to destroy that system through protracted military conflict.
With this in mind, a better historical template is a trade war. The century-long trade wars and struggles between Venice, Genoa, Byzantium, and Portugal for control over lucrative trade networks are a good starting point.

Trade War?

The historical examples of these trade wars can give us a ‘feel’ for this type of conflict.

Slow Victory. In this type of conflict, opponents attempt to squeeze and drain their opponents until they are no longer a threat or find ways to generate wealth that the opponents cannot access. It’s a slow race to see who can become the wealthiest and most capable of generating more wealth, until dominance becomes uncontestable. This conflict is similar to the Cold War, but instead of two separate economic systems, it’s inside the same system.
Reinvention. An opponent will attempt a strategic reversal by reinventing the contest when possible — for example, breaking a competitor’s monopoly by finding a way to produce it domestically (Byzantium and silk worms smuggled out of China), a new trade route (Portugal, around Africa), or unique defensive weapons that make their trade routes hard to disrupt (Byzantium’s Greek fire).
Sudden Escalation. Occasionally, trade wars escalate into hot wars that destroy the opponent. For example, the Byzantine crackdown and arrest of Venetian merchants led the Venetians to use debt to convince French crusaders to join them in sacking Constantinople. Another example: the Genoan fleet sent to blockade Venice was trapped in a Venetian lagoon for nearly a year before capitulating, leaving the city vulnerable to French domination.

Network War

Of course, the conflict between the US and China isn’t just a struggle over the global trade network. It’s a war for dominance over the entire global network and what it makes possible.

Logical connectivity — from sprawling JiT (just in time) manufacturing chains to energy flows.
Social connectivity — from social decision making to networked politics.
New technology — from AIs to advanced chips.

Now, let’s frame the orientation for this networked conflict.

The center of gravity of the conflict will be within the global network.
As a result, the war will mainly be in the network domain. Participants will focus on growing their access to the network, increasing its throughput, suppressing the opponent’s access to it, and increasing their control over it.

The goal of the conflict will be network dominance, while avoiding the overreach that would trigger a catastrophic conflict. Military action will only be effective if it advances the war in the primary domain — the network.

John Robb
Substack and Grey Swan

P.S. from Addison: Something’s definitely in the air.

Jennifer asked me yesterday why more people aren’t reading Empire of Debt, Demise of the Dollar, or Financial Reckoning Day. “So many of the themes you began writing about 25 years ago are happening right now,” she said. I’ve noticed she’s been more concerned lately — for our money, our future, and the kids.

Then this morning, three emails popped into the inbox.

The publisher at Wiley wrote: “Are you doing a new push for the books? The market’s right.” Nudge, nudge.

Brian Q. said: “I’m on page 80. I love the wit. I can tell Twain was an influence, but I’m scared. I’m retired. My kids are 32 and 30. I fear the worst. Is there any way out of this debt?”

And from Jerry N.: “I wish to purchase all three books. What’s the best way to do that?”

Coincidence? I don’t know, but something’s up. Jerry, you can get all three books at the links below. We haven’t bundled them into a set yet. Maybe now would be a good time.

Your thoughts before we continue? Add them to the mix here: addison@greyswanfraternity.com

“We do not benefit from a relationship with China or any other country in which we put our values and our ideals aside.”

– Barack Obama

Author's Image

It didn’t, but it did put on a course toward conflict.

Orienting the Conflict

The first step is to orient our thinking by determining what kind of war this is and what victory looks like.

While this conflict could become a war, that isn’t likely since it isn’t a struggle between existentially incompatible systems.
On the contrary, we both use the same system (capitalism) and profit mightily from participating in a global trading system. It’s in neither country’s interest to destroy that system through protracted military conflict.
With this in mind, a better historical template is a trade war. The century-long trade wars and struggles between Venice, Genoa, Byzantium, and Portugal for control over lucrative trade networks are a good starting point.

Trade War?

The historical examples of these trade wars can give us a ‘feel’ for this type of conflict.

Slow Victory. In this type of conflict, opponents attempt to squeeze and drain their opponents until they are no longer a threat or find ways to generate wealth that the opponents cannot access. It’s a slow race to see who can become the wealthiest and most capable of generating more wealth, until dominance becomes uncontestable. This conflict is similar to the Cold War, but instead of two separate economic systems, it’s inside the same system.
Reinvention. An opponent will attempt a strategic reversal by reinventing the contest when possible — for example, breaking a competitor’s monopoly by finding a way to produce it domestically (Byzantium and silk worms smuggled out of China), a new trade route (Portugal, around Africa), or unique defensive weapons that make their trade routes hard to disrupt (Byzantium’s Greek fire).
Sudden Escalation. Occasionally, trade wars escalate into hot wars that destroy the opponent. For example, the Byzantine crackdown and arrest of Venetian merchants led the Venetians to use debt to convince French crusaders to join them in sacking Constantinople. Another example: the Genoan fleet sent to blockade Venice was trapped in a Venetian lagoon for nearly a year before capitulating, leaving the city vulnerable to French domination.

Network War

Of course, the conflict between the US and China isn’t just a struggle over the global trade network. It’s a war for dominance over the entire global network and what it makes possible.

Logical connectivity — from sprawling JiT (just in time) manufacturing chains to energy flows.
Social connectivity — from social decision making to networked politics.
New technology — from AIs to advanced chips.

Now, let’s frame the orientation for this networked conflict.

The center of gravity of the conflict will be within the global network.
As a result, the war will mainly be in the network domain. Participants will focus on growing their access to the network, increasing its throughput, suppressing the opponent’s access to it, and increasing their control over it.

John Robb
Substack and Grey Swan

P.S. from Addison: Something’s definitely in the air.

Then this morning, three emails popped into the inbox.

The publisher at Wiley wrote: “Are you doing a new push for the books? The market’s right.” Nudge, nudge.

Brian Q. said: “I’m on page 80. I love the wit. I can tell Twain was an influence, but I’m scared. I’m retired. My kids are 32 and 30. I fear the worst. Is there any way out of this debt?”

And from Jerry N.: “I wish to purchase all three books. What’s the best way to do that?”

Coincidence? I don’t know, but something’s up. Jerry, you can get all three books at the links below. We haven’t bundled them into a set yet. Maybe now would be a good time.

Your thoughts before we continue? Add them to the mix here: addison@greyswanfraternity.com

As copper flowed into the United States, LME inventories thinned and backwardation steepened. Higher U.S. pricing, tariff protection, and lower political risk made American warehouses the most attractive destination for metal. Each new shipment strengthened the spread.

The arbitrage, once triggered, became self-reinforcing. Traders were not participating in theory; they were responding to the physical incentives in front of them.

The United States had quietly become the marginal buyer of the world’s most important industrial metal. China, long the gravitational center of global copper demand, found itself on the outside.

Under the frost-crusted shrubs, the bears are sniffing around for scraps of bloody meat.

They smell the subtle rot of credit stress, central-bank desperation, and debt that’s beginning to steam in the cold. They’re not charging — not yet. But they’re present. Watching. Testing the doors.

Retail investors, last in line, await the Fed’s final announcement of the year on Wednesday. Then the central planners of the world get their turn: the Bank of England, Bank of Japan, and the European Central Bank.

Treasuries just suffered their worst week since June. And in Japan — the quiet godfather of global liquidity — something fundamental is breaking.

Silver continues its blistering ascent. Gold and bitcoin have settled in at $4,200 and $92,000, respectively.

It’s absurd, really, for any politician to be talking about “affordability.”

The data is clear. If higher prices are your goal, let the government “fix” them.

Mandates, paperwork, and busybodies telling you what you can and can’t do – it’s not a surprise why costs add up.

In contrast, if you want lower prices, do nothing– zilch. Let the market work.

For 30 years, Japan was the land where interest rates went to die.

The Bank of Japan used yield-curve control to keep long-term rates sedated. Traders joked that shorting Japanese bonds was the “widow-maker trade.”

Not anymore.

On November 20, 2025, everything changed. Quietly, but decisively.

The Bank of Japan finally pulled the plug on decades of easy money. Negative rates were removed. Yield-curve control was abandoned. The policy rate was lifted to a 17-year high.

Suddenly, global markets had to reprice something they had ignored for years.

What happens when the world’s largest creditor nation stops exporting cheap capital and starts pulling it back home?

The answer came fast. Bond yields in Europe and the United States began climbing. The Japanese yen strengthened sharply. Wall Street faltered.